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A Failure-Distance Based Method to Bound the
Reliability of Non-Repairable Fault-Tolerant Systems
without the Knowledge of Minimal Cuts
Víctor Suñé and Juan A. Carrasco, Member, IEEE
Abstract—CTMC (continuous-time Markov chains) are a com-
monly used formalism for modeling fault-tolerant systems. One
of the major drawbacks of CTMC is the well-known state-space
explosion problem. This paper develops and analyzes a method
(SC-BM) to compute bounds for the reliability of nonrepairable
fault-tolerant systems in which only a portion of the state space of
the CTMC is generated. SC-BM uses the failure distance concept
as the method described in [1] but, unlike that method, which
is based on the computation of exact failure distances, SC-BM
uses lower bounds for failure distances, which are computed on
the system fault-tree, avoiding the computation and holding of
all minimal cuts as required in [1]. This is important because
computation of all minimal cuts is NP-hard and the number of
minimal cuts can be very large. In some cases SC-BM gives exactly
the same bounds as the method in [1]; in other cases it gives less
tight bounds. SC-BM computes tight bounds for the reliability of
quite complex systems with an affordable number of generated
states for short to quite large mission times. The analysis of several
examples seems to show that the bounds obtained by SC-BM
appreciably outperform those obtained by simpler methods, e.g.,
[2], and, when they are not equal, are only slightly worse than the
bounds obtained by the method in [1]. In addition, the overhead
in CPU time due to computing lower bounds for failure distances
seems to be reasonable.
Index Terms—Bounds, fault-tolerant system, nonrepairable
system, state-space reduction.
ACRONYMS1
CTMC continuous-time Markov chain
DTMC discrete-time Markov chain
LB lower bound
UB upper bound
BM-1 bounding method in [1]
SC-BM bounding method in this paper
T-SC-BM implementation of T-BM in this paper
FIFO first in, first out
Definitions:
• bag: collection of possibly repeated elements. The nota-
tion is for a bag including
instances of element , ; each is a
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part of . Notation for bags is from [4] except that: 1) a
subbag of bag is , whether is strictly contained
in or not, and 2) bags are denoted as explained here
• minimal cut: minimal bag of component classes whose
failure implies the system failure
• failure bag: bag of component classes which can fail si-
multaneously (in a single transition)
• failure distance from state : minimum number of compo-
nents which must fail, in addition to those already failed
in , to fail the system
Notation:
unreliability: system has failed by time
LB for obtained with SC-BM, BM-1 or
T-SC-BM
UB for obtained with SC-BM
UB for obtained with BM-1
UB for obtained with T-SC-BM
: acyclic CTMC modeling the system
: acyclic CTMC used in SC-BM for
computing and
: acyclic CTMC used in T-SC-BM
for computing and
output rate of state in
transition rate from state to state in
randomization rate ( the maximum output rate of
an state of both and )
: DTMC obtained by [3] ran-
domizing with rate
: DTMC obtained by [3] ran-
domizing with rate
up states: set of states of in which the system is
operational
down state: absorbing state that represents system
failure
subset of that is generated
state of without failed components
failure distance from state
number of failed components in is
LB for
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bag of failed component classes in state
MC set of minimal cuts of the system
cardinality of a set or a bag [4]
set of a failure bags of the system
FC set of different cardinalities of failure bags
UB for the rate with which failure bag is
realized form any state
logical operator AND, OR.
I. INTRODUCTION
MODELING is important in the design and analysisof fault-tolerant systems. These systems exhibit
a stochastic behavior and, therefore, probabilistic mea-
sures are adequate for their quantitative assessment. An
important class of such systems are those whose compo-
nents cannot be repaired. For these systems the reliability,
system has not failed by time , or its complement, ,
are suitable measures. Non-repairable fault-tolerant systems
can be modeled using combinatorial methods and, more
generally, hierarchical methods [5], [6]. Hierarchical methods
require the behavior of components and subsystems to be
mutually s-independent. Recently, combinatorial methods have
been improved, allowing some complex dependencies such as
lack of coverage [7], [8] to be dealt with. However, when the
failure rate of a component depends on the global state of the
system, then state-level modeling techniques such as CTMC
are required. A major drawback of CTMC, especially of those
for modeling complex systems, is that the size of their state
space is typically so large that it goes far beyond the available
computing resources. This well-known problem is referred to
as state-space explosion. One approach to attack this problem
is the use of bounding methods, in which only a subset of
is generated. Typically, includes the states with up to a
given number of failed components. Bounds for can be
trivially derived (e.g., [2]) by modifying so that exits of
from not going to are directed to an absorbing state . The
probability of the modified CTMC being in state at time
is a LB for , and the probability of being in
at time is an UB for . This LB is usually good, but the
UB is not, because it is equivalent to assuming that the system
is nonoperational in all the states in , which can be far from
reality. A more recent paper [1] proposed the BM-1 method, in
which the behavior of the system out of the generated portion
is bounded using the failure distance concept, resulting in an
improved UB for .
BM-1 requires computing the failure distances from the states
of that are reachable from in a single transition. These com-
putations can be done knowing MC. We have developed an algo-
rithm [9] which computes MC efficiently in many cases. How-
ever, computing MC is NP-hard [10] and in some cases the algo-
rithm [9] can break down. In addition, MC can be very large,
causing a large memory overhead due to the need to hold MC
and related data structures for efficient failure distances compu-
tation.
This paper develops and analyzes SC-BM, our new bounding
method for using LB for failure distances which are ob-
tained on the fault tree, avoiding the computation and holding
of MC.
Section II describes the class of models assumed in SC-BM
and shows how bounds for are computed in SC-BM from
LB for failure distances satisfying some conditions.
Section III defines the LB for failure distances used in
SC-BM, proves that they satisfy the required conditions,
describes the procedures used in SC-BM to compute such LB,
and describes how the CTMC is generated in SC-BM.
Section IV describes how the CTMC is generated in
T-SC-BM and proves that the cost (in terms of CPU time)
of SC-BM is at most identical to the cost of T-SC-BM when
.
Section V analyzes SC-BM using two examples, and com-
pares it with T-SC-BM and BM-1.
II. CLASS OF MODELS AND UNRELIABILITY BOUNDS
We consider acyclic CTMC modeling nonrepairable fault-
tolerant systems. We assume that the system is made up of com-
ponents which can be grouped into classes, the components
of the same class being indistinguishable from a dependability
view-point. The operational/down state of the system is deter-
mined by the unfailed/failed state of its components by a fault
tree. The fault tree of the system is constructed using AND and
OR gates and inputs. Inputs have associated with them different
bags of the form . Input with associated bag has the
value 1 iff at least components of class are failed. The value
of the fault tree is computed as usual from the values of its in-
puts. The system is down iff the value of the fault tree is 1. To
avoid trivialities, we assume that no inputs , with associated
bags , , feed the same gate. This is not a true
restriction because, for and an OR gate, , can be re-
placed by and for an AND gate by . Each state has
associated with it a bag of failed component classes . There
is a single state, state , with . Each transition of
has associated with it a failure bag , including the compo-
nents which are failed when the transition is followed. Imper-
fect coverage can be modeled by introducing fictitious compo-
nents which do not fail by themselves and to which uncovered
faults are propagated. This point is illustrated by the following
example.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of an example system, adapted
from [6], which is used for illustration. The system consists of
• 2 memory modules MM and MM ,
• 3 CPU chips CPUC,
• 2 port chips PTC.
In addition, to model imperfect coverage, 1 fictitious component
RMM , , and 2 fictitious components RCM are added
to the system. One CPUC and 1 PTC are spares. Each MM has
10 memory chips MC , 2 of which are spares, and 1 interface
chip IC . The IC and active MC , PTC and CPUC fail, respec-
tively, with rate , , and . Spare chips fail
with rates , and , where ,
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TABLE I
FAILURE BAGS OF THE EXAMPLE SYSTEM AND, FOR EACH FAILURE BAG e, A SUITABLE UB  (e)
Fig. 1. Architecture of the example system.
is a dormancy factor. Recovery is hierarchical. A fault in a MC
is covered with probability . Failure of MM and faults of
CPUC and PTC are covered with probabilities ,
and , respectively. To model imperfect coverage, an un-
covered fault in a MC is propagated to the fictitious compo-
nent RMM , and an uncovered failure of MM , and an uncov-
ered fault of a CPUC or a PTC are propagated to the 2 fictitious
components RCM. The MM is operational if at least 8 MC ,
the IC and the RMM are unfailed. The system is operational
if at least 1 memory module is operational, and at least 2 CPUC,
1 PTC and 1 RCM are unfailed.
Table I gives the failure bags of the example system and, for
each failure bag , a suitable expressed in terms of the
above failure rates and coverage probabilities, and the dormancy
factor . Thus, e.g.,
• is the fault of a memory chip of the first memory module
which is covered at memory module level,
• is the fault of that chip which is uncovered at memory
module level and covered at system level,
• is the uncovered fault of the chip.
For the example system,
FC
and
A. SC-BM
SC-BM computes and by solving the tran-
sient regime of the CTMC . The CTMC has state space
. Although other selections for are
possible, we assume that includes all the up states of with
up to failed components. We also assume
. The states , pessimistically approximate the
behavior of from the instant in which enters from .
The transition rates in
• from to , with , and
• from to , with
are as in . The transition rates from states to , with
have values , and for each and
each FC, there is a transition rate from to .
The initial probability distribution of in is the same as the
initial probability distribution of in . Section III-A shows
that for the example system. Fig. 2 shows the structure
of for the example system. The bounds are:
(1)
The correctness of is trivial. The correctness of
is proved in Section II-B. Given the relationships
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Fig. 2. State transition diagram ofX for the example system.
between and the CTMC used in BM-1 [1], it is easy to
conclude that SC-BM and BM-1 give exactly the same bounds
when , . Otherwise, BM-1 gives, in general,
tighter bounds than SC-BM.
B. Correctness of
This section establishes the correctness of under the
conditions , and .
The proof is constructed with the aid of the DTMC and .
Since [11] is probabilistically identical to
and is probabilistically
identical to , where is a
Poisson process with arrival rate independent of both and
:
(2)
(3)
Let
(4)
(5)
Then we have the following two results.
Lemma 1: , , is decreasing on .
Proposition 1: , , ,
.
Using lemma 1 and proposition 1, it is possible to prove
proposition 2, which establishes that “upper bounds” .
Proposition 2: Let , , ,
. Then,
, .
Using proposition 2, the correctness of can be
proved:
Theorem 1: Let , , , and
. Then, .
Lemma 1, which is formally identical to [1, Lemma 1], propo-
sitions 1 and 2, and theorem 1 are proved in the Appendix.
III. COMPUTATION OF LB FOR FAILURE DISTANCES AND
MODEL GENERATION IN SC-BM
Definitions:
• node (also referred to as event): gate or input of the fault
tree
• related: two inputs , are related if and
,
• realized: an event is realized if
• path: a sequence of nodes such that
,
• reachable node: a node is reachable from node if there
exists a path from to
• module: is a module iff every path ,
Reach , Reach contains node , and for
each input Support , no related inputs exist outside
Support
Notation:
set of component classes
set of inputs (basic events) of the fault tree; each
input has associated with it a different bag, ,
of the form ,
set of gates (complex events) of the fault tree
root gate (top event) of the fault tree
type type of gate : AND or OR
fanout of (set of nodes fed by) node
fanin of (set of nodes that feed) node
value (1 or 0) of an input or a gate
Reach node plus set of nodes reachable from
Support Reach ,
, where is a bag of
component classes and is a node
distance from to : minimum number of com-
ponents which must fail in addition to those in the
bag of component classes to realize event
LB for
: LB for the failure distance from a
failure bag to
This Section III:
a) Obtains the LB for the failure dis-
tances from states used in SC-BM. The bounds are
proved to fulfill the conditions which, according to the-
orem 1, guarantee the correctness of and the
condition iff , which eases the gen-
eration of (see Section III-D).
b) Gives sufficient conditions for .
c) Describes procedures which can be used to compute the
LB for the failure distances from the successors of a state,
and describes how the CTMC is generated in SC-BM
using those procedures.
A. Recursive Definition of LB for Failure Distances
The LB for failure distances used in
SC-BM are defined on the fault tree of the system using the
concept of module, which generalizes to component classes the
definition in [12], [13], in the sense that a module is a node
such that the subtree hanging from it has that node as only entry
point and every input of the subtree does not have related inputs
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TABLE II
COMPUTATION OF ~L = ~d (;; g ) TRAVERSING DEPTH-FIRST LEFT-MOST THE FAULT TREE OF THE EXAMPLE SYSTEM STARTING AT g AND USING (6)
outside the subtree. To determine which gates or inputs of the
fault tree are modules, the algorithm LTA/DR [13] is used with
a small modification to deal with component classes: during the
first depth-first left-most traversal of the fault tree (step 2 of the
algorithm LTA/DR), visit to implies simultaneous visit
(viz, with the same time-stamp as for ) to all inputs related to
it.
Given a bag of component classes , , is
defined recursively by:
For
if no is part of
if is part of .
(6)
For OR
(7)
For AND
(8)
is a module
is a module
is not a module
is not a module
Eqs. (6)–(8) allow computation of traversing the
fault tree depth-first left-most, starting at . Fig. 3 shows the
fault tree of the example system. Table II shows how
is computed for that fault tree. All gates and inputs
of the fault tree are modules and, therefore, (8) reduces to:
B. Correctness of the LB for Failure Distances and Related
Results
Theorems 2–4 are proved in [14].
Theorem 2: Let be a bag of component classes and
. Then, the , defined recursively by (6)–(8), verify:
Fig. 3. Fault tree of the example system. The bag associated with an input is
given next to that input.
a) .
b) iff .
Theorem 3: Let and let be a bag of component
classes. Then, if for every with
type AND one of the following two conditions holds:
a) Every is a module or an input.
b) There exists only one which is neither a module
nor an input and every , is a module with
.
Theorem 4: Let , , be bags of component classes
with and let . Then,
Let be a state. With and , part b of
theorem 2 implies iff , part a implies
, and both results imply
for . In addition, taking , , , and
, the left inequality of theorem 4 states
that . Thus, the derived
satisfy the requirements of theorem 1, guaranteeing that
the upper bound obtained by SC-BM is correct. In ad-
dition, we have iff . With and
, theorem 3 gives a sufficient condition for
which can be checked inexpensively. Finally, when , the-
orem 2 with and implies .
Thus, when the condition of theorem 3 is satisfied or ,
and SC-BM gives the same bounds as BM-1.
C. Computation of the LB for Failure Distances
Section III-D shows that the generation of the CTMC can
be done knowing for all successors of each state
. Each could be computed from by traversing the
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fault tree as described in Section III-A. However, that procedure
is expensive if the fault tree is large. This section describes a
typically much more efficient procedure, comp_all_d, which
can compute for all successors of a state.
The procedure comp_all_d is built on top of three proce-
dures: update_d, comp_d, restore_d.
Each node of the fault tree holds a distance variable
properly initialized. The procedure update_d takes as inputs
a bag of component classes , a positive integer ub and a stack
CS, and processes the fault tree as follows. For each that is
part of , the procedure makes for
each input , and follows a recursive processing
from . The recursive processing from a node of the fault
tree involves computing for each a potential new
value for using (7) for OR gates and (8) for AND gates
with , instead of . If the potential new
value for is ub and smaller than the current value of
, the variable is updated and the processing of the
fault tree continues recursively from node . When a distance
variable is updated, the corresponding node and the old value of
the variable are put in CS.
The procedure comp_d takes as inputs a bag of component
classes , two nonnegative integers and , with ,
and a stack CS. If , the procedure returns without
doing anything else. If , the procedure makes the call
update_d( , , CS) and returns .
The procedure restore_d takes as input a stack CS and
simply restores the distance variable of the nodes kept in CS
to their old values. After the call to restore_d, CS becomes
empty.
The procedure comp_all_d takes as inputs a bag of failed
component classes , the LB , a subset of the
set of failure bags , and , , and computes
for each . For the procedure to work properly,
must be and the distance variable of each node of the
fault tree must have been initialized to . The procedure
is:
Let CS and CS be empty stacks.
comp_d CS ;
for (each
;
;
comp_d CS ;
restore_d CS ;
restore_d CS ;
After calling the procedure, the distance variable of
each node of the fault tree has the value . The fol-
lowing two results are from [13]. Theorem 5 is used in Sec-
tion III-D to justify the algorithm for the generation of in
SC-BM. Theorem 6 asserts the correctness of comp_all_d.
Theorem 5: Let be a bag of component classes, let
and be nonnegative integers with ,
and let CS be a stack. Let the distance variable of each
Fig. 4. Processing of the fault tree of the example system during the call
update_d(F = MC [1]; ub = 2; CS). The distance variable values are
given next to each node. The “!” shows their changes.
node of the fault tree be initialized to . Then, the call
comp_d CS returns .
Theorem 6: Let be a bag of component classes, let
, and let . Let the distance variable
of each node of the fault tree be initialized to . Then,
the call comp_all_d computes cor-
rectly the lower bounds , .
This Section III-C ends by illustrating the procedure
comp_all_d using the example system of Section II, whose
fault tree is in Fig. 3. The procedure is illustrated for the
inputs MC , and with
IC , MC RMM , , and
(see Table I). The procedure begins by creating empty stacks
CS and CS and making the call comp_d MC ,
CS . Since , that call to comp_d
results in the call update_d MC , CS .
Fig. 4 illustrates the processing of the fault tree during that
call. The of each node is initialized to
before the call. The only input having associated with it a
bag related to MC is . Using (6), is updated to
and the pair is stored in CS. The
change in is not propagated up the fault tree because
the new value of is not smaller than . Next,
the procedure processes the failure bag IC . The
values of , are and ; the procedure continues by
making the call comp_d IC , CS
followed by the call restore_d CS . The first call returns
without processing the fault tree because .
This results in MC IC . The second call
does not restore any distance variable because CS .
The procedure continues by processing the failure bag
MC RMM . The values of , become
and and the procedure continues by making the call
comp_d MC RMM CS .
Since , the call to comp_d results in the call up-
date_d MC RMM CS . Fig. 5
illustrates the processing of the fault tree during that call. The
only inputs having associated with them a bag related to some
part of MC RMM are , . Using (6), is
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Fig. 5. Processing of the fault tree of the example system during the call
update_d(F = MC [1]RMM [1]; ub = 1; CS). The distance variable
values are given next to each node. The “!” shows their changes.
updated to 2 and the pair is stored in CS . The change in
is not propagated up the fault tree because the new value
of is not smaller than . Next, the input is dealt
with. Using (6), is updated to 0 and the pair is
stored in CS . Since the new value of is smaller than
, that change is propagated up the fault tree to gate .
Using (7), the potential new value for is 0. Since that
potential new value is smaller than both the old value of the
variable and , is updated, the pair ( is stored
in CS and the change is propagated up the fault tree to gate .
Using (8), the potential new value for is 1, which is not
smaller than . Then, is not updated, and because
there is no pending processing of the fault tree, the call up-
date_d MC RMM CS ends and the
call comp_d MC RMM CS
returns the value . This
results in MC MC RMM . The pro-
cedure finishes by making the calls restore_d CS and
restore_d CS , which leave the fault tree with the of
each node equal to .
D. Generation of the CTMC in SC-BM
To describe with detail the generation of the CTMC in
SC-BM, let the failure behavior of the fault-tolerant system be
described by a high-level specification made up of a set of rules.
Each rule is composed of a guard condition that determines
when the rule is enabled in a given (current) state, an execu-
tion part that allows to obtain a next state from the current one,
and a rate specification that determines the rate with which the
next state is reached. Each rule has associated with it a failure
bag meaning that the rule models the failure of the com-
ponents in . Different rules can have associated with them
the same failure bag. We assume the availability of three proce-
dures named enabled, rate and successor, which pro-
vide the interface with the high-level specification required for
model generation. The procedureenabled has as inputs a state
and returns the set of rules enabled in . The procedure
rate takes as inputs a state and a rule and returns the rate
with which the next state is reached from following rule
. The procedure successor takes as inputs a state and a
rule and returns the state reached from following . Al-
though the interface with the high-level specification could be
provided by other sets of procedures, the assumed one is rea-
sonable, matches our implementation, and leads to an efficient
generation of , allowing a fair comparison between SC-BM
and T-SC-BM.
The and , are computed before the generation
of . To do that, first the of each node of the fault tree
is initialized to by traversing the fault tree depth-first
left-most, starting at and using (6)–(8). Since ,
after the initialization holds . The , are
computed using comp_d and restore_d. Note that
and, according to the definition of ,
. This allows the computation of , by
creating an empty stack CS and, for each , making the call
comp_d CS followed by the call restore_d(CS).
Using theorem 5 with , and , the value
returned by each call comp_d CS is . After com-
puting , , the distance variable of each node of the
fault tree holds its initial value .
The CTMC is generated breadth-first using , ,
, and a FIFO queue , by calling comp_all_d, en-
abled, rate, and successor. The queue holds triplets
corresponding to the states that have to be
processed. The generation of begins by creating the states
and , , adding the transition rates from to
(see Section II-A), and making
and . Then, while , a triplet
is pulled out of and processed as follows. First,
is obtained by making the call enabled . Next, letting
, the LB
for the failure distance from the states with bag of failed
component classes , are obtained by making
the call comp_all_d .
The LB for the failure distance from the state reached from
following rule is . Then, each
is processed as follows. 1) is computed by making the
call rate . 2) If , the state reached from
following is a down state and a transition rate from to
is added. If and , the state
reached from following belongs to , and
a transition rate from to is added. 3) If
and , the state reached from following
belongs to the subset of states that have to be generated. In that
case, the reached state, , is obtained by making the call suc-
cessor ; if , is added to , a transition rate
from to is added and the triple
is put into ; if , a transition rate from to is
added.
IV. GENERATION OF IN T-SC-BM AND COMPARISON OF
SC-BM WITH T-SC-BM
This section describes T-SC-BM, and shows that, when
, the cost (in terms of CPU time) of SC-BM is at most identical
to the cost of T-SC-BM.
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T-BM requires knowledge of the operational/down state
of the successors of an operational state . T-SC-BM uses
eval_all_ft to determine, using the fault tree, whether the
states reached from a given state following the rules enabled in
it are operational or down. The procedure eval_all_ft is
built on top of two procedures: eval_ft and restore_ft.
Each input of the fault tree has associated with it a distance
variable , and each node of the fault tree has associated
with it a value variable . The procedure eval_ft takes
as inputs a bag of failed component classes and a stack CS,
and works as follows. For each input , for which
is part of , is set to and, if
becomes 0, is implied to 1 (i.e., is set to 1). Each
implication to 1 of an input is propagated up the fault tree
while the visited gate becomes implied to 1. When a distance
variable changes, the corresponding input and the old value of
the variable are put in CS. Gates that become implied to 1 are
put in CS too. The procedure returns .
The procedure restore_ft has as input a stack CS. For
each input of the fault tree held in CS, the procedure restores
to its old value, setting to 0 if the restored value is
. For each gate kept in CS, the procedure sets to 0.
After the call to restore_ft, CS becomes empty.
The procedure eval_all_ft takes as inputs a bag of failed
component classes and a subset , and for each ,
computes the value, , of the root gate of the fault tree when
the bag of failed component classes is . For the procedure
to work properly, the of each input , of the
fault tree must have been initialized to , and the of each
node of the fault tree must have been set to 0. The procedure is
as follows.
Let CS and CS be empty stacks.
eval_ft ;
for (each )
eval_ft ;
restore_ft CS ;
restore_ft CS ;
After calling the procedure, for each input ,
of the fault tree and for each node
of the fault tree.
The CTMC is generated breadth-first using a FIFO queue
and calling the procedure eval_all_ft and the procedures
enabled, rate, successor described in Section III-D.
The queue holds pairs corresponding to the states
that have to be processed. The generation of begins by
creating the states and , and making and
. Then, while , a pair is pulled out
of and processed as follows. 1) The set of rules enabled
in , , is obtained by making the call enabled . 2)
Denoting by the failure bag associated with rule and
letting , the values of the root gate of the
fault tree, , for the states with bag of failed component
classes , are obtained by making the call
eval_all_ft . The value of the root gate of the
fault tree for the state reached from following rule
is . 3) Each is processed as follows. 3a)
The rate with which the next state is reached from
following rule is computed by making the call rate .
3b) If , then the state reached from following
is a down state and a transition rate from to is added.
If and , the state reached
from following belongs to and a transition rate from
to is added. 3c) If and ,
the state reached from following belongs to the subset of
states that have to be generated. In that case, the reached state,
, is obtained by making the call successor and, if
, is added to , a transition rate from to is
added, and the pair is put into ; if , a
transition rate from to is added.
This section ends by comparing the cost (in terms of CPU
time) of SC-BM with the cost of T-SC-BM for the particular
case . The comparison is done with the aid of theorem 7,
proved in [14].
Theorem 7: Let be a bag of component classes, let
, and let . If , then the cost of
the call comp_all_d after setting
, is at most equal to the cost of
the call eval_all_ft after setting , ,
, and , .
The subset generated by both methods is the same.
Then, taking into account the description of the generation
of in SC-BM done in Section III-D and the description
of the generation of in T-SC-BM done in this section,
the former differs basically from the latter only in that a
call to comp_all_d is done during the generation of
whenever a call to eval_all_ft is done during the gen-
eration of . Then, since solution of and takes
negligible time compared with their generation, comparison
of the costs of both methods can be done approximately by
comparing, for a given and , the cost of
the call comp_all_d
done in SC-BM with the cost of the corresponding call
eval_all_ft done in T-SC-BM. Therefore,
invoking theorem 7 with ,
and , it follows that, for the particular
case , the cost of SC-BM is at most equal to the cost of
T-SC-BM.
V. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
This section analyzes SC-BM and compares it with BM-1
and T-SC-BM by means of two large examples representing two
scenarios:
1) The fault tree satisfies the condition of theorem 3 and
.
2) The fault tree does not satisfy the condition of theorem 3
and .
In both examples, the state is the initial state of . The
CTMC are solved in all methods using the randomization
method [15]. In example 1, SC-BM and BM-1 give exactly
the same bounds, since theorem 3 guarantees . In
example 2, SC-BM gives less tight bounds than BM-1. Since
for both examples, SC-BM could have in both examples
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Fig. 6. Architecture of example 1.
a higher cost (in terms of CPU time) than T-SC-BM. The
parameter of the algorithms for computing failure distances
used in BM-1 [1] was set to 2 for both examples.
A. Example 1 (Scenario 1)
The system, adapted from [6], has 114 components, and its
architecture is shown in Fig. 6. The system has 3 computing
modules CM , , one of which is spare. The CM
module includes:
• 3 memory modules MM , ,
• 3 identical CPU chips ,
• 2 identical port chips PTC .
1 memory module, 1 CPUC and 1 PTC are spares. The MM
has:
• 10 identical memory chips MC , 2 of which are spares,
• 1 interface chip IC .
Memory modules MM and MM are identical (e.g.,
MM and MM ).
Also:
• Active MC and active IC fail, respectively, with rates
and ;
• Active PTC and active CPUC fail, respectively, with
rates and .
• Spare chips fail with rates , , ,
, where , is a dormancy factor.
Components of nonoperational memory modules and nonoper-
ational computing modules do not fail.
Recovery is hierarchical. A fault in a MC is covered with
probability . Failure of MM , a CPUC and a PTC is suc-
cessfully covered with probabilities , and ,
respectively. Failure of is covered with probability .
Coverage faults are modeled by introducing fictitious com-
ponents as explained in Section II:
• An uncovered fault in a MC is propagated to a fictitious
component RMM .
• An uncovered failure in MM , a CPUC or a PTC is
propagated to 2 fictitious components RCM .
• An uncovered failure in CM is propagated to 4 fictitious
components RSYS.
Also:
• MM is operational if at least 8 MC , the IC and the
RMM are unfailed.
• CM is operational if at least 2 memory modules are oper-
ational and 2 CPUC , 1 PTC , and 1 RCM are unfailed.
• The system is operational if at least 2 computing modules
are operational and 1 RSYS is unfailed.
The fault tree has:
• 37 inputs, all of which are modules,
• 25 gates, 13 of which are modules,
• 73 edges.
The fault tree is defined by the logical expressions:
FM
FMM FM FM
FC FMM FMM FMM
FCC FC FC
FCC FCC FCC
The bags associated with the inputs of the fault tree are:
MC IC
RMM CPUC
PTC RCM
RSYS
Also, , MC .
The numerical results are for the parameters:
B. Example 2 (Scenario 2)
The system has 60 components, and its architecture is
sketched in Fig. 7. The system has 4 processing clusters that
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Fig. 7. Architecture of Example 2.
communicate through 2 double-ring networks, A and B; both
networks have the same structure.
• Processing cluster , includes 3 processing units
PU .
• Network A includes 8 nodes NA , . Nodes
NA and NA communicate through direct
(clockwise) and reverse (counter-clockwise) links DA
and RA , respectively.
• Network B includes 8 nodes NB , . Nodes
NB and NB communicate through direct and
reverse links DB and RB , respectively.
The operational configuration of the system includes
• 2 processing units from the processing clusters with 2 or
3 unfailed processing units,
• 1 processing unit from the processing clusters with 1 un-
failed processing unit,
• the components of network A or B, with priority given to
network A, required to build one of the operational net-
work configurations described next. The operational net-
work configurations are, in the order they are tried:
• A direct ring including all nodes and direct links.
• A reverse ring including all nodes and reverse links.
• A configuration, which is used when parallel direct and
inverse links are failed, including all nodes and links
except the 2 failed links.
• A configuration, which is used when, for instance, node
fails, including all nodes except node , and all links except
those between node and nodes .
When one of these network operational configurations is
built, the corresponding network is said to be operational. The
components included in the system operational configuration
are called active.
• Active processing units, active nodes, and active links fail
with rates , and , respectively.
• Inactive processing units fail with rate , where ,
, is a dormancy factor.
• Inactive nodes and links of network A fail, respectively,
with rate and when the network is operational
and do not fail otherwise.
• Inactive nodes and links of network B fail, respectively,
with rate and .
• Coverage is perfect for link faults.
• Faults in active processing units and nodes are covered
with probabilities and , respectively.
• Coverage faults are modeled by adding 3 fictitious com-
ponents RSYS as explained in Section II and propagating
to all of them any uncovered fault.
The system is operational if the following a, b, c are all true:
a) each processing cluster has at least 1 unfailed processing
unit,
b) one of the previously described operational network con-
figurations for either network A or network B can be built,
c) at least 1 RSYS is unfailed.
The system fault-tree has
• 53 inputs, all of which are modules,
• 40 gates, 4 of which are modules,
• 764 edges.
The fault tree is described by:
DRA DRB
RRA RRB
FRA
FRB
FRA
FRB
NETA DRA RRA FRA FRA
NETB DRB RRB FRB FRB
NET NETA NETB
NET
The bags associated with the inputs of the fault tree are:
NA DA RA
NB DB RB
PU RSYS
Also, , , MC .
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Fig. 8. Unreliability bounds for example 1 as a function of time (years) and
K .
Fig. 9. Unreliability bounds for example 2 as a function of time (years) and
K .
The numerical results have been obtained for the parameter
values:
C. Results and Discussion
We use for example 1, and for
example 2.
Figs. 8 and 9 show the unreliability bounds obtained using
SC-BM for examples 1 and 2, respectively, as a function of time
(in years).2 The bounds degrade as time increases. In both exam-
ples, however, SC-BM achieves tight bounds for mission times
up to 5 years using affordable numbers of states.
21 month = 730 hours; 1 year = 8760 hours.
TABLE III
EXAMPLE 2: RELATIVE UNRELIABILITY BAND OBTAINED WITH SC-BM,
urb(t) (TOP), AND T-SC-BM, urb (t) (BOTTOM)
TABLE IV
EXAMPLE 2: RELATIVE UNRELIABILITY BAND OBTAINED WITH SC-BM,
urb(t) (TOP), BM-1, urb (t) (MIDDLE), AND T-SC-BM, urb (t) (BOTTOM)
Tables III and IV compare, for, respectively, examples 1 and
2, and several mission times, the relative unreliability band ob-
tained with SC-BM,
against that obtained with BM-1,
and that obtained with T-SC-BM,
The relative band is not shown in Table III because, for
example 1, , and, therefore,
.
SC-BM appreciably outperforms T-SC-BM in terms of
bounds tightness. Thus, for mission times up to 1 year,
for example 1,
for example 2.
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TABLE V
CPU TIME IN SECONDS TO GENERATE THE CTMC AND COMPUTE THE
UNRELIABILITY BOUNDS FOR t = 5 YEARS FOR BOTH EXAMPLES USING
SC-BM (TOP), BM-1 (MIDDLE) AND T-SC-BM (BOTTOM)
In addition, SC-BM can compute bounds which are almost as
tight or even tighter than those given by T-SC-BM using appre-
ciably fewer states. Thus,
• for example 1 and years, the relative band obtained
by SC-BM with ( ) is better than that
obtained by T-SC-BM with ( );
• for example 2 and years, the relative band obtained
by SC-BM with ( ) is only slightly
worse than that obtained by T-SC-BM with (
).
For example 1, SC-BM and BM-1 give exactly the same
bounds. For example 2, the bounds obtained by SC-BM are
only slightly worse than the bounds obtained by BM-1.
Table V gives the CPU times in seconds for years
for examples 1 and 2 and all 3 methods. The times were mea-
sured on a 167 MHz, 128 MB SPARC Ultra 1 workstation. As
discussed in Section IV, with respect to T-SC-BM, SC-BM can
introduce an appreciable CPU time overhead due to computing
LB for failure distances from states only when . That is
the case for examples 1 and 2; the results in Table V indicate
that the overhead is reasonable, ranging:
• from 20% for example 2 and ,
• to 40% for example 1 and .
In addition, SC-BM is always appreciably faster than BM-1.
To conclude, SC-BM seems to give appreciably tighter
bounds than T-SC-BM and seems to be only slightly slower
than T-SC-BM, when it is not as fast or faster ( ).
Compared with BM-1, when the condition of theorem 3 is
satisfied or , then SC-BM is guaranteed to give exactly
the same bounds as BM-1, and, in those cases, SC-BM is
definitely better, since it does not require the computation of
MC, does not incur in the memory overhead associated with the
holding of MC and related data structures for failure distance
computation [1], and seems to be faster. When the condition
of theorem 3 is not satisfied and , SC-BM gives, in
general, less tighter bounds than BM-1, but, since SC-BM
does not require the computing of MC, which is an NP-hard
problem, there are cases in which SC-BM applies while BM-1
does not. In addition, even when MC can be computed, the
memory overhead in BM-1 associated with MC is large if MC
is large, and, then, SC-BM might be better than BM-1 when
considering the tradeoff between memory-consumption and
bounds-tightness.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
From the structure of ,
(A-1)
(A-2)
Also, for , ,
(A-3)
The proof is by induction on .
• Base case ( ): We show that ,
. For , using (A-2), and (A-1):
For , using (A-2),
• Induction step: Let and assume ,
is decreasing on ; it has to be shown that
, .
For , using (A-3), , , and
(A-1),
For , using (A-3), , and the induction
hypothesis,
Q.E.D.
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B. Proof of Proposition 1
Let be the contribution to associated with failure
bags . Then, . If , does not have
any contribution because and a failure bag
reduces the failure distance by at most . Therefore,
(A-4)
Let be the number of failed components of the system in state
. Since is absorbing, for ,
(A-5)
The proof is by induction on .
• Base case ( ): We show that
, with , . Using (A-4),
, and (A-2),
• Induction step: Let and assume
, , ; it has to
be shown that , ,
. Using (A-5), (which implies
), and the induction hypothesis,
Using , lemma 1, and that for FC and
we have
(A-6)
Since ,
(A-7)
Combining (A-6) and (A-7),
For , ; for , ;
then, using , lemma 1 (which guarantees
, ), (A-1),
and (A-3),
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Q.E.D.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
The following notation is used in the proof:
can enter through or directly from . Because is
absorbing, conditioning the entry of in through to the
step in which enters and the entry state, and using (5):
Since, for , and , can be
partitioned as:
Then, since ,
Using this partition of and proposition 1,
Using lemma 1, , the relations between and
, and (4):
Q.E.D.
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Using (2) and ,
Using proposition 2,
(3), and (1),
Q.E.D.
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